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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

THE COMMERCIAL BANK OF UTAH,
a corporation,
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vs.

LEONARD A. MADSEN, and ARDETH
MADSEN, his wife, also known as
ARDITH MADSEN
Defendants and Respondents,
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vs.

BOB JEPPSEN,
Purchaser and Co-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

DON V. TIBBS, JR.,
Attorney for the Respondents.
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ADDITIONS TO STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondents agree with the Statement of the Case
so made in Appellant's Brief. That an Order of Sale and
Certified Copy for Foreclosure Decree prepared by the Attorney for the Apellant was filed. That the Sheriff noticed
the sale, made the same according to the Order and Decree,
filed his retum showing that the property stated in the decree was sold as one parcel for the sum of $501.00 to the
named purchaser.
ADDITIONS TO THE TESTIMONY
The appellant in presenting the testimony at
has stressed parts of the evidence and passed
other evidence and omitted some entirely; so,
dents at this time will submit the following for
attention:

the hearing
over much
the responthe court's

The Sheriff, Ulysses Larsen, testified that on the 12th
day of April, 1950, in his office, he had conversation with
P. N. Anderson, attomey for the Appellant, conceming the
Order for Sale and Decree for Foreclosure in the above entitled case. Mr. Anderson had put in the Order that the
time of the sale was to be 10:00 A.M. on May 8th, 1950.
They allegedly decided during this conversation that the
time for the sale should be changed to 11:00 A.M. on the
same day. Due to a misunderstanding who was to change the
Order, it was never changed either by the Sheriff or the
Attorney for the Appellant. That on the 8th day of May at
10:00 A.M. the Sheriff held the sale, but only after having
gone through the statuatory requirements and having given
2
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notice for the sale to be at 10:00 A.M. (Tr. Rec. pp. 3, 4,
5, 6, 7).

Mr. Paul Smith made the first bid for the sum of
$49.00. The Sheriff refused this bid telling Mr. Smith, that
it was unreasonable. Mr. Smith then asked the Sheriff what
sum was a reasonable bid. He stated about $1000,00. Mr.
Smith then offered $500.00. Mr. Jeppson bid $501.00 and the
property was struck off to him. When asked why he sold
the property in one parcel or piece, the Sheriff stated that
it had the appearance of being in one parcel even though
the description was in two lots. None of the bidders present,
nor the defendents, objected to the sale in one parcel. None
of the bidders nor the defendants had any notice of the Conversation between the Sheriff and Attorney for the Appellant
on the 12th day of April. All orders and publications stated
the sale to be at 10:00 A.M. on the day in question.
Witness C. H. Beal, a real estate broker, testified that
he owned a lot in the same block as this property. That in
his opinion the market value of the land was what they
could get out of it. His opinion was what they could get
out of it. His opinion was that the value would be about
$1400.00 or $1500.00. He stated that there was a crude fence
separating the two lots (Tr. Rec. pp. 8, 9, 10, 11).
Mr. P. N. Anderson, Attorney for the Appellant, made
a statement confirming the Sheriff's testimony. That he prepared the Order and Notices for the sale set for 10:00 A.M.
That he had a conversation with the Sheriff concerning
changing the time to 11:00 A.M., but that due to a misunder3
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standing the change was never made. That he never told
any of the other interested parties concerning this conversation, and he never checked to determine if the Order and
Notices were so changed (Tr. Rec. pp. 11, 12).
Witness Paul M. Smith, a resident of Manti, and owner
of four lots in Manti, was at the Sheriff's sale on the 8th day
of May. He is the State of Utah appraiser in this area, and
has had considerable experience as appraiser for the District
Court of Sanpete County. Mr. Smith states that after an
apparent stall by the Sheriff the sale was opened for bids.
That he bid $49.00, but tht Sheriff refused to accept it because the bid was unreasonable. Mr. Smith then asked the
Sheriff what sum was reasonable. The Sheriff answered
that a reasonable sum was one thousand dollars. Mr. Smith
said it wasn't worth one thousand dollars, and he thereafter
bid $500.00. At the same time Mr. J. B. Peacock of Manti,
Utah, bid $475.00. The property was finally sold to the purchaser, Mr. Jeppson, for the sum of $501.00 (Sup. Tr. Rec.
pp. 3, 4, 5).
Witness J. B. Peacock, a resident of Manti and owner
of real property, was also at the sale. He bid $475.00 for the
property treating both lots as one parcel. He stated that
there was no fence on the land but there were several strands
of wire. He stated that the rental value was probably about
$7.50 a month (Sup. Tr. Rec. pp. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
13).
The Defendant Leonard Madsen, was at the sale, and
he states that he had no reason to object because the land
4
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was
sale
had
and
sale

sold as one parcel. That he had no other noitce of the
than that published in the papers for 10: 00 A.M. He
no knowledge of any conversation between the Sheriff
the Attorney for the Appellant concerning time of
(Sup. Tr. Rec. pp. 13, 14, 15).
ARGUMENT

·It

!i!t

!!

The respondents will argue the points as set out in
the Appellant's Brief.
Appellant's Point I
THAT THE SALE WAS NOT MADE OF THE
PROPERTY IN TWO PARCELS AS REQUIRED BY
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 69 (e) 3, RESULTING IN GROSSLY INADEQUATE BIDS, TO THE
PREJUDICE OF PLAINTIFF.
The part of Rule 69 (e) 3, which we are concerned
with reads as follows:
"And when the sale is of real property, consisting
of several known lots or parcels, they must be sold
separately; or when a portion of such real property
is claimed by a third person, and he requires it to
be sold separately, such portion must be thus sold."
- - - - "The judgement debtor, if present at the
sale, may also direct the order in which the property,
real or personal, shall be sold, when such property
consists of several known lots or parcels, or of articles
which can be sold to advantage separatly, and the
officer must follow such directions."
5
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It
cription
separate
conform
35, 27).

is the Appellant's contention that the fact the deswas of lots 1 and 2, that they are therefore two
parcels, and should have been sold separately to
with the rule stated above (Rec. pp. 31, 32, 33, 34,

The respondents rely upon the contention that you
can have two or more lots and still only have one parcel
containing them. Often a building will be placed on several
lots, It would seem reasonable that in such a situation all
of these lots would constitute only one parcel. To say that
the Rule 69 (e) 3, intended that each of these lots be sold
separately would be placing false construction on the rule.

33 C.J.S. Section 210, page 449, states as follows:
"What constitutes separate tract, lot, or parcel.
It has been held that it is the title of the debtor
himself, as fixed by his deed, which determines
whether the property shall be considered as one lot
or several for the purpose of an execution sale, but
it cannot. be said that because a deed describes the
property conveyed as certain numbered lots that such
lots do or do not constitute separate parcels (Palmour v. Roper Ga. 45 S.E. 790). An owner may convert two or more lots into one known parcel by his
use of the land (In re Roach, 130 A. 676 Del., Security
Trust Co. v. Sloman, Mich. 233 N.W. 216), and a
parcel may be single although divided by a ~
(Mich. Security Trust Co. v. Sloman, 233 N.W. 216)"
In 23 Corpus Juris, Section 589, page e33, Note 34,
it states the reason for such a rule:

6
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"Palmour v. Roper, 119 Ga 10, 45 SE 790; Conley
v. Redwine, 109 Ga. 640, 35 SE 92, 77 AmSR 389.
(a) REASON FOR RULE. It is well known fact
that land lots are laid off purely for purposes of location and description, and have no reference to divisions of land into what are known as tracts, or parcels, except as the two may arbitrarily chance to
coinside. Palmour v. Roper,
(b) ILLUSTRATION. Although a tract of land has
in fact been laid off into streets and town lots, and
is within the limits of an unincorporated town, yet,
where there are no visible marks on the surface of
the tract to indicate the metes and bounds of the
lots, and the only thing in the nature of the street
appearing thereon is a recognized public road of the
county, a levy upon and sale of the entire tract as
one parcel is proper and legal. Conley v. Redwine."

;:c:

~

Under our present case the land consists of lots 1 and
2, a house on one lot and the other vacant. The lots of the
property adjoin each other and constitute the South half of
Block 28, Plat A, IVIanti City Survey. At the sale all the parties treated the property as a single parcel. Even the Sheriff,
witness for the Appellant, when asked why he sold as one
parcel, answered that the property has the appearance of
being one parcel, though the description covers two lots (Tr.
pp. 7). So, also, the bidders each treated the property as
one parcel (Sup. Tr. Rec. pp. 4, line 13, page 6 line 14, pp.
7 line 20). From the above evidence it would therefore
appear that the property though described in two lots is
actually one parcel, and the sale was therefore made according to Rule 69 (e) 3. There was some evidence that a fence

7
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was dividing the lots; giving Mr. Beal (Tr. pp 9, line 16,
Tr. pp. 10, line 22), there was also evidence given by Mr.
Peacock saying there wasn't a fence (Sup. Tr. Rec. pp. 11,
line 18) . There was no evidence to show if the alleged fence
was on the line dividing the lots. If there was such evidence it would appear that the bidders at this sale would
have asked the Sheriff if the sale included property beyond
the fence, or that the defendants would have raised the
question. The only parties who feel that this consisted of
two separate parcels are the Appellant Bank and it's attorney,
and there were no such instructions in the Order of Sale
which was prepared by them (Rec. pp. 31, 32, 33, 34, 35,
27).
It is therefore the
pondent that the sale was
69 (e) 3, of Utah Rules
pellant has failed to state
Appellant does not plead
part of the respondent.

contention of the Purchaser Resmade in conformity with the Rule
of Civil Procedure, and the Apany Cause of Action against him.
or claim any wrongful act on the

For the purpose of this argument however, let us
assume that because this property was described as lots 1
and 2, it is two different parcels. What would be the effect
on appellant's contention? It has been held that the statutory provision for a division of property is merely directory
(23 C.J. p 633 note 23) and that the propriety of a sale
en masse is a matter within the discretion of the officer,
having in view the object to make the property bring the
best possible price, as is also the question as to the divis-

8
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ibility of the property and the size and value of the parcels offered, and the officer's determination of this question
is, in the absence of fraud, conclusive (Ind. Nelson v. Bronnenburg, 81 Ind. 193). In this case the Sheriff sold the property the way he did because it had the appearance of being
in one parcel, and because there were no instructions to the
contrary in the order prepared by Attorney for the Appellant. So also, by the actions of the bidders it is doubtful
that the Sheriff could have received a higher bid even
though offered in two parcels. Defendant states that he does
not think it could have been sold for more money (Sup.
Tr. Rec. pp. 14, line 8).
It can also be argued by the Purchaser Respondent

that both the plaintiff and the defendants waived their
rights to object to the procedure used by the Sheriff in selling this property.
33 C. J. S. Section 210, c, page 450, states:

~:

~·

; i!

"As the rule requiring a sale in parcels is intended
for the benefit of execution defendant, compliance
with it may be waived by him (Clover v. W.B.
Scarborough Co. 238 P. 1104 Calif., Mont. Fox v.
Curry, 29 P 2nd 663, 23 CJ p 635, note 55, O'Brien
v. Davis, 103 Ala. 429, 15 S. 860, where it was intimated that by being present at the sale and failing
to make any objection defendant waives any irregularity in selling en masse).
33 C.J.S. Section 228, page 485 under c. Execution
Creditor it is stated:
9
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"When not transcending the mandate of his writ, the
Sheriff may be considered in some degree as the
judgement creditor's agent, and the latter is as a
rule estopped from assailing the validity of a sale
made by virtue of such writ (Ga. Lynn v. New England Mortg. Sec. Co., 26 S.E. 750, 98 Ga 442, 23
C. J. p 669 note 91) ."
In this case the attorney for the Appellant prepared
the Order of Sale and also the Decree for Foreclosure, if
he desired that the property be sold in separate lots he
should have so notified the Sheriff in the respective Order
and Decree. Instead Appellant advertised the two lots for
sale as one parcel, to-wit, "Lots 1 and 2 of Block 28, Plat
"A" of Manti City Survey" (Rec. pp. 32). If the Appellant
had intended the Sheriff to sell the property in two parcels,
he would have advertised them for sale as Lot 1 of Block
28, Plat "A" of Manti City Survey, and Lot 2 of Block 28,
Plat "A" of Manti City Survey. To allow the Appellent to
come in and get the sale set aside because the Sheriff acted
according to his own Order would be without merit. Therefore it appears to the Respondents that the Appellant
has waived any right to object to this sale.
The Appellant states that the property was sold at a
sum grossly inadequate. May the Court recall that at th~
time of the sale there were three bidders present, each a
resident of Manti, one with experience as an appraiser
(Sup. Tr. Rec. pp. 3), and the other owners of property.
None of their bids were over $501.00. Appellant has one
witness which states the property to be worth $1400.00 or
10
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$1500.00, but that the market price is what he can get out
of it.
This witness, a real estate broker, was not however
at the sale, although he had an opportunity to so be. He
also owned a piece of property in the same block with a
house on it, and he sold it for $1000.00, he did not state what
he paid for it.
50 C.J.S. Section 59, p 677 states as a general rule:
"A judicial sale usually will not be vacated or set
aside for mere inadequacy of price, unless the inadequacy is so gross as to raise a presumption of fraud,
or to shock the conscience of the court."
Page 682 states:
"Ordinarily, the highest bid made at an open judicial sale fairly conducted, after full notice, in the
face of such competition as can be attracted, is a
fair and just criterion of the value of the property
at that time, (Va. Schweitzer v. Stroh, 30 S.E. 2nd
689) and opinions, affidavits of undervaluation, and
the like, are entitled to little weight in comparison
with the fact established by the sale and it's results.
The mere tender of an upset bid of substantially more
than the sum realized at the sale is not conclusive
that the property sold for an inadequate price."
For the above stated reasons the Sale price of $501.00
was an adequate bid for the property sold.
That the Sale made by the Sheriff was conducted
according to Utah Rules of Civil Precedure 69 (e) 3, in that
the property was but one parcel.
11
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Appellant's Point II
THAT THE PROCEEDING BY THE SHERIFF IN
FAILING TO NOTICE SALE AT ELEVEN O'CLOCK
A.M., AS INSTRUCTED BY PLAINTIFF AND AS UNDERSTOOD BY PLIANTIFF AND SHERIFF, AND IDS
FAILING TO NOTIFY PLAINTIFF OF IDS FAILURE
TO COMPLY WITH THE INSTRUCTION AND CONFORM WITH SUCH UNDERSTANDING AND THEREBY PRECLUDING PLAINTIFF FROM BEING PRESENT,
RESULTED IN GROSSLY INADEQUATE BIDS AND
SALE PRICE OF THE PROPERTY, AND CONSTITUTED
A PREJUDICIAL IRREGULARITY.
The question here seems to be whether a private conversation between the Sheriff and the Attorney for the Appellant should be binding upon the court and the purchaser.
To allow such a conversation to be grounds for setting aside a Foreclosure sale involving innocent third parties
would be to say that Purchasers at Execution Sales and
Foreclosure Sales have no rights what-so-ever. The evidence
is pure hearsay as to the purchaser and is not binding on
him or anyone.

If the conversation did take place, it would appear
that the Appellant's remedy would be against the Sheriff
for failing to act according to instructions. None of the respondents nor the court had any knowledge of this alleged
conversation until after a valid Sheriff's sale had been completed, nor until Appellant made it's motion to set aside the
sale. If a mistake was made, it was made by the careless-

12
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ness of the Attorney for the Appellant, or the Sheriff, and
the remedy should be against them. To allow the Appellant
to come in and complain against this innocent third person,
the purchaser, would be to give authority to private conversations, and to ignore the Order of the Court. The Sheriff's
duty is to act according to the Order of the Court (Rec. pp.
31, 32, 33, 34, 35, and 27), and in the present case he so
acted.

Appellant's Point III
THAT THE SALE PRICE ACCEPTED BY THE
SHERIFF WAS GROSSLY INCOMMENSURATE TO THE
FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE PROPERTY SOLD.
The respondents have argued this same statement under it's discussion of Appellant's Point No. 1.
50 C.J.S. Section 59, page 681, states:
"d. Proof
The burden of proving inadequacy
of price suficient to warrant setting aside a judicial
sale rests on the complaining party' and the court
may consider all proper and relevant ciscumstances in determining the matter."
The District Court of Sanpete County after hearing
the witnesses for the Appellant and the witnesses for the
Respondent held that the sale was consistent with the value
of the property on the execution sale (Rec. pp. 46).
59 C.J.S. Section 750, page 1382, states as follows:
"Notwithstanding alleged additional

ci);'cumstanc~s,

13
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however, setting aside the sale may not be proper
or necessary in a particular case, as where the superior equity still remains with the purchaser, or
where the mistake, irregularity, or other circumstance had nothing to do with the price the property brought, or the price obtained is not shown to
have been inadequate. Each case depends largely
on its own peculiar facts, and whether the circumstances, coupled with inadequacy of price, are sufficient to warrant setting aside the sale is a matter largely within the discretition of the trial court.''
The appellant would have the Court believe that the
value of this property is the price a judgement creditor
would bid in his debt on a foreclosure sale. That is not
so. A judgement creditor may pay a very high price if he
figures that his deficiency judgement is worthless, and may
pay a very low price if he has no competition and he knows
the deficiency judgement is valuable. To say therefore that
the bid in the present case is the value of the land, when
there was an actual sale and competition between three
bidders to find the purchase price, would not be true.
The value of the property sold on Foreclosure Sale
is the amount the purchaser paid for it, and may be much
less on such sale than on the open market. The reason
being that the purchaser doesn't necessarily get good title
and his title is also subject to redemption. This appeal is
a good example of the additional costs a purchaser is required to go to in the protection of the title purchased.
The Appellant would have the Court believe that
justice lies only on the side fo the Appellant. They state

14
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on page 10 of their Brief:
"The writers do not intend to impute malfeasance on the part of the Sheriff in this instance.
But will it be wise on the part of this Court to
affirm the dereliction on the part of this Sheriff
and set a precedent?"
The respondents submit the decision and the order
appealed from, and desire the Court to realize that there
is no dereliction of duty on the part of the Sheriff. He followed the Order of the Court in performing this sale. He
noticed the property for sale in accordance with the written Notice of Sale given to him by the Appellant's Attorney.
He used his best judgement in selling this property in one
parcel. He accepted the highest bid from the bidders present at the sale. He made a correct return according to law.
The only precedent that will be made in sustaining this
decision and order, is that of sustaining a Foreclosure Sale
made according to the Rules of Civil Procedure for the
State of Utah. To make any other decision would be to
cause injustice to the purchaser, and to set a precedent
for setting aside Foreclosure Sales based upon private conversations outside the knowledge or jurisdiction of the Court,
and upon the carelessness of the Appellent in failing to attend the sale at the time the property was advertised for
sale. Certainly the Appellant is bound by the advertised
notice of sale, as all other persons are so bound.
In conclusion, there is only one question to decide.
Should a judgement creditor be able to set aside a Valid

15
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Foreclosure Sale because he allegedly made a
and forgot to come to the sale.

mistake,

Respectfully submitted,

Attorney jOT the
Respondents.
Manti, Utah

16
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